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THE POSSIBILITY PRINCIPLE AND THE
TRUTHMAKERS FOR MODAL TRUTHS
Timothy Pawl
A necessary part of David Armstrong’s account of truthmakers for modal
truths is his Possibility principle: any truthmaker for a contingent truth is also
a truthmaker for the possibility of the complement of that contingent truth (if
T makes p true and p is contingent, then T makes }*p true). I criticize
Armstrong’s Possibility principle for two reasons. First, his argument for the
Possibility principle both relies on an unwarranted generalization and vitiates
his desire for relevant truthmakers. His argument undercuts relevant truth-
makers by entailing that each contingent being is a truthmaker for all modal
truths. Second, even if the argument seems successful, the Possibility principle
is subject to counterexamples. Armstrong’s being composed of more than ﬁfty
atoms makes it true that something composed of more than ﬁfty atoms exists
and that truth is contingent, but his being composed of more than ﬁfty atoms
does not make it true that it is possible that it is not the case that something
composed of more than ﬁfty atoms exists.
David Armstrong is the most well-known proponent of truthmaker theory,
and his book, Truth and Truthmakers, is the most well-known defence of it.
In this book, Armstrong provides his Possibility principle: any truthmaker
for a contingent truth is also a truthmaker for the possibility of the
complement of that contingent truth (if T makes p true and p is contingent,
then T makes }*p true), a principle with which his account of truthmakers
for modal truths stands or falls. And, while the book has received much
critical attention, this particular principle, which is so important to his work,
has received relatively little.1 Furthermore, what attention it has received
has been, in all but one problematic case, paid to the argument Armstrong
gives for the principle, and not to whether the principle itself is true or false.2
Armstrong has conceded, in the pages of this very journal, that his argument
in Truth and Truthmakers was ‘marred by a very bad mistake’ [2006b: 245]
1Cameron [2005], McDaniel [2005], Mumford [2005] and Tallant [2005] all provide careful reviews of the
book, but none mentions the Possibility principle. Alward [2004: 76–7] and Bostock [2005: 369] brieﬂy discuss
the principle without calling it into question; Hochberg [2006: 187–8] doesn’t argue that the Possibility
principle is false, but he does claim that Armstrong does not go far enough in showing how the intrinsicality
of contingency should be understood in his argument and that Armstrong must, in the end, appeal to a
fundamentally modal entity in his account of truthmakers for modal truths; Keller [2007] argues clearly that
Armstrong’s [2004] argument for the Possibility principle is ﬂawed, but does not provide an argument that
the principle itself is false; and Simons [2005: 254] claims that the argument is invalid and that the Possi-
bility principle is implausible, but oﬀers no reasons for thinking the principle implausible.
2Kalhat [2008] provides the one extant argument for the falsity of the Possibility principle. It is problematic
because it, like Armstrong’s [2007: 103] argument, has de re–de dicto confusions. I will discuss this problem
later as my second smallish point in x3.
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and that he ‘certainly made a dreadful hash of arguing’ for it [2005: 271], but
he also says that he still thinks the Possibility principle is defensible. He has
since given another argument for the Possibility principle, which has yet to
be discussed in the literature [2007: 103]. In this paper, I criticize that new
argument, then I go on to argue that the Possibility principle is false.
Armstrong criticizes both David Lewis and Alvin Plantinga for
ontological extravagance in his book, Truth and Truthmakers. He writes,
after reference to Lewis and Plantinga:
It seems to me very surprising that so many good philosophers consider that
huge metaphysical commitments must be made in order to give an account of
these truths [of mere possibility].
[2004: 83]
He goes on to say that ‘these philosophers are bringing giants to do a boy’s
work’ [loc. cit.].
The giants to whom Armstrong refers are well known.3 Armstrong takes
Plantinga to seek the ontological grounding of modal truths in abstract
possible worlds and haecceities. Lewis argues that at least some modal
truths are made true by concrete, unactual worlds and their parts.4 It would
be better, all else being equal, if we could ground modal truths without
recourse to necessarily existing haecceities or unactual, concrete worlds.
Armstrong has attempted to provide truthmakers for modal truths without
such ontological bloating. To cure this distention he prescribes the
Possibility principle.
If Armstrong’s account of truthmakers for modal truths were successful,
it would be of no small signiﬁcance. For, if successful, it removes a strong
incentive to carry the heavy ontological burden that Plantinga and Lewis
hold.5 If Armstrong can show that we can ground modal truths without the
costs associated with Lewis and Plantinga’s ontologies, he has done a great
service to modal metaphysics. He will have, to use his own words, splashed
‘cold water on the need for the wildly ambitious truthmakers that have been
proposed by a number of contemporary metaphysicians’ [2004: 85].
I criticize Armstrong’s attempted ontological grounding for modal truths
on two grounds. First, I claim that his argument for the Possibility principle is
weak. As presented in Truth and Truthmakers, it is unsound. Armstrong has
recognized this infelicity and attempted to amend it. His emendation,
however, has two problems of its own. It requires an unwarranted general-
ization and it runs counter to Armstrong’s stated desire for relevant
truthmakers. Second, even if the argument seems successful, the Possibility
principle is subject to counterexamples. Armstrong makes it true that
something composed ofmore than ﬁfty atoms exists and that truth is contingent,
but he does not make it true that it is possible that nothing composed of more
3To see the accounts that elicit this charge of extravagance, see Plantinga [1974] and Lewis [2001b, especially
x1].
4Lewis [2001b], especially x1.8. This isn’t the whole story for Lewis. The actual world and its parts make some
modal truths true as well. The point here, though, is that Lewis needs unactual worlds and their parts in
addition to the actual world and its parts.
5I say a strong incentive since each thinker claims that other beneﬁts accrue from his preferred ontology.
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than ﬁfty atoms exists. I don’t thinkArmstrong does the boy’s work he sets out
to do. And that may be because one really needs giants for it.
1. Armstrong’s Truthmakers for Truths of Possibility
Truths of possibility can be distinguished into truths of possibility that are
also truths of actuality and truths of mere possibility. A truth, p, is a truth of
mere possibility if and only if }p is true and p is false (and, of course, the
ﬁrst sort of truth of possibility mentioned obtains if and only if }p and p are
both true). Armstrong thinks that truths of mere possibility are the diﬃcult
truths of possibility to ground. For the other sort of truths—call them truths
of actual possibility—Armstrong claims that the very thing that makes p
true also makes }p true.
To ground truths of mere possibility, he provides his Possibility principle.
In Truth and Truthmakers, Armstrong oﬀers the following argument for the
Possibility principle. Suppose T makes p true. Suppose p is contingent (if it
isn’t contingent, we aren’t talking about truths of mere possibility anymore).
Given that p is contingent, it follows that it is possible that not-p. Armstrong
claims (mistakenly, as we will see below) that since T makes p true, and p
entails that it is possible that not-p, it seems that T should make it true that it
is possible that not-p. Thus, if T makes p true and p is contingent, then T
makes }*p true. ‘At a stroke’, says Armstrong, ‘we have removed the need
for any truthmakers for truths of ‘‘mere possibility’’ except the truthmakers
for contingent truths’ [2004: 84].
Armstrong formalizes his argument as follows, where the arrow stands for
the cross-categorical necessitation that holds between truthmakers and
truthbearers. Armstrong writes [loc. cit.]:
1. (T ! p) (assumed)
2. that p is contingent (assumed)
3. p entails that it is possible that not-p (from 2 and the nature of the
contingency of propositions)
Thus,
4. T ! that it is possible that not-p6 (by 1, 3 and the
Entailment principle)
The justiﬁcation for the concluding inference requires explanation.
Armstrong relies on
The Entailment principle: If T makes true that p and that p entails* that q,
then T makes true that q.
6I’ve changed the denotation of propositions in his argument to match the style I use in this article.
Armstrong uses angled brackets (5p4) to denote propositions, whereas I italicize to denote propositions
(p). Otherwise, this is how he presents his argument. One might notice that in this argument for the Possibility
principle Armstrong writes of p and the possibility of not-p, whereas in the Possibility principle itself he writes
of not-p and the possibility of p. This change has no eﬀect on the logic of the argument or the viability of my
coming criticisms.
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Armstrong writes ‘entails*’ rather than ‘entails’ because he doesn’t intend
the Entailment principle to range over all entailments. If the Entailment
principle were to range over all entailments, then any thing would be a
truthmaker for every necessary truth. Armstrong makes it true that
Armstrong exists. That Armstrong exists logically entails that, necessarily,
2þ 2¼ 4. Armstrong, however, is not a truthmaker for that mathematical
truth. So there must be some way to rein in the entailment* in the
Entailment principle so that we have ‘relevant truthmakers’ [2004: 11].
Armstrong doesn’t provide a way for doing this. He writes, ‘I will simply
assume that something is available’ [loc. cit.]. In the following I assume
with him that there is some way to rein in entailment appropriately. If
there ends up being no way to do so, then the argument against
Armstrong’s truthmakers for modal truths would end here, since the last
step in his argument requires the Entailment principle. Finally, notice
that since Armstrong puts the Entailment principle to work in justi-
fying the move from 3 to 4, the entailment in 3 must be understood as
entailment*. Otherwise, the Entailment principle would not be appli-
cable to 3.
2. A ‘Sad Blunder’
There is a problem with Armstrong’s argument for the Possibility principle.
Armstrong has recently realized this problem in his argument, calling it a
‘sad blunder’ [2007: 101]. At a conference entitled Truths and Truthmakers
he said,
I thought that all we need do is to consider some truthmaker of a contingent
truth, and then use the Entailment principle to show that this truthmaker was
also a truthmaker for the entailed mere possibility. This is clearly wrong. To
get an entailment we need that the truth is a contingent one, and this means
that we need, not a truthmaker for p, but a truthmaker for the truth p is
contingent.7
[2007: 101]
This is all he says before moving on to provide a new argument for
the Possibility principle, which I will discuss later. The quotation is
opaque and could use some elucidation. Here is what I take Armstrong
to mean.
That p is contingent entails that it is possible that not-p. After all, p is
contingent if and only if both p and *p are possible. Given that p is
contingent, it follows straightforwardly that it is possible that not-p. This
is not what 3 says, however. It doesn’t say,
(A) That p is contingent entails* that it is possible that not-p;
7Again, I’ve modiﬁed the way in which propositions are referred to in this quotation. Rather than using
Armstrong’s brackets, I’ve continued to use italics to denote propositions.
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rather, it says,
(B) p entails* that it is possible that not-p.
This, I think, is where the problem for the argument begins. (A) is true, but I
see no reason to aﬃrm (B).
One reason Armstrong may have had in support of (B) is that 2 already
tells us that p is contingent. So (B) isn’t the obviously false claim that any
proposition p entails* that its negation is possible. Rather, it is the much
more modest claim that any contingent proposition entails* that its negation
is possible. (B), in the light of p’s contingency, provides a legitimate
entailment.
This suggested support for (B) doesn’t work. For p alone still doesn’t
entail* the possibility of its negation, even if it is contingent. P, together with
that p is contingent, entails* that the negation of p is possible. But p alone
doesn’t entail* that the negation of p is possible, and thus this suggested
support is no support of (B) at all, since (B) requires that p entail* that it is
possible that not-p.
Another way to see this is to start a proof with p and attempt to prove
that }*p without recourse to a premise that says that p is contingent. It
can’t be done. If one makes recourse to a premise that p is contingent, then p
alone doesn’t entail* }*p. So Armstrong’s premise 3—that p entails that it
is possible that not-p—is false. I take it that this is what Armstrong had in
mind when he called this step in his argument a sad blunder, and I think he
is right to have found this objection decisive.8
3. Armstrong’s New Argument for the Possibility Principle
After voicing this objection to his argument for the Possibility principle, he
goes on to provide another argument for it. He argues that it is plausible
that if T is a truthmaker for a contingent truth p, then T is a truthmaker for
that p is contingent. If he is right, then he has a justiﬁcation for the
Possibility principle. For consider: that p is contingent entails* that it is
possible that not-p. So, by the Entailment principle, if T is a truthmaker for
that p is contingent then T is a truthmaker for that it is possible that not-p.
And if Armstrong is right that if T is a truthmaker for a contingent truth p,
then T is a truthmaker for that p is contingent, then by a hypothetical
syllogism, if T is a truthmaker for a contingent truth p, then T is a
truthmaker for that it is possible that not-p—which is a restatement of the
Possibility principle.
He argues as follows, writing of a contingent truth p and its truthmaker T:
Now consider some contingent being in nature. It might not have existed. But
can we not add: its existence or non-existence as a contingent being is not
logically dependent on the existence or non-existence of any further contingent
being. A counterfactual holds: it might have been there, but unaccompanied
8For more discussion of the problems with Armstrong’s [2004] argument, see Keller [2007].
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[N.B. Armstrong assumes that all beings are contingent]. And if so, must not
the truthmaker for the contingency of its existence be itself, T? So if T is a
truthmaker for some contingent truth p, then it will also be a truthmaker for
that p is contingent.
[2007: 103]
Armstrong asks us to consider some contingent being in nature, T. T could
have existed without anything else existing; it could have been alone in the
world. If it were the case that T exists but is alone in the world, it would still
be true that it is contingent that T exists. T’s solitude doesn’t make it exist
necessarily; also, remember, Armstrong asks us to consider a contingent
being. So that it is contingent that T exists is true. But, since it is alone, the
only thing in that world to do the truthmaking for the truth that it is
contingent that T exists is T, that very lonely thing. And given that modal
truths have truthmakers, which Armstrong assumes, something must make
it true that it is contingent that T exists. So T is a truthmaker for that it is
contingent that T exists. This argument isn’t applicable only to T. Any other
contingent being, if it were alone in the world, would still exist contingently.
By generalizing we arrive at the conclusion that if T is a truthmaker for
some contingent truth p, it is also a truthmaker for that p is contingent (I
think this is an unwarranted generalization, as I shall argue in what follows).
The rest of the argument should be easy to see. T makes some contingent
truth, p, true. If T makes p true, it is also a truthmaker for that p is
contingent (given the preceding argument). So T is a truthmaker for that p is
contingent. Furthermore, as (A) said above, that p is contingent entails* that
*p is possible. So, again, by the Entailment principle, T is a truthmaker for
that*p is possible. Hence we arrive at the Possibility principle: If T makes p
true and p is contingent, then T makes }*p true.
I will make two smallish points concerning this argument before I go on
to provide two objections to it. First, I don’t think that Armstrong can say
that T’s existence or non-existence is not logically dependent on the
existence or non-existence of any further contingent being. I take it that
Armstrong understands the logical dependence of object x on object y to
mean that x couldn’t exist if y didn’t exist. Consider, though, for instance,
the state of aﬀairs of Armstrong’s being male. Isn’t that state of aﬀairs
logically dependent on Armstrong? Armstrong thinks that states of aﬀairs
are non-mereologically composed.9 In this case, the state of aﬀairs of
Armstrong’s being male is non-mereologically composed of Armstrong and
maleness. How could such a state of aﬀairs exist and Armstrong not exist?
This should give us pause in aﬃrming Armstrong’s claim that anything can
exist unaccompanied. We should remember, however, that unaccompanied
existence is an important part of his argument, since he wants to claim that
the lonely thing, T, is a truthmaker for that T is contingent. The claim that T
is the truthmaker for that T is contingent becomes plausible if T can exist
alone, since, as Armstrong assumes, every truth needs a truthmaker, and
9Armstrong [1997], especially chapter 8. Perhaps you wonder what sort of beast non-mereological
constitution could be. Isn’t mereology the study of constitution? David Lewis, in more than one place,
expresses his perplexity at Armstrong’s notion of non-mereological constitution; cf. Lewis [2005: 34].
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there is nothing but T to do the truthmaking in the lonely world. If T can’t
be alone, however, then there could (at least epistemically) be something else
there to do the truthmaking for that T is contingent. And hence the support
that the lonely thing argument lends to the claim that T is the truthmaker
for that T is contingent collapses.
My second smallish point has to do with Armstrong’s use of language. He
writes: ‘must not the truthmaker for the contingency of [T’s] existence be
itself, T?’ Strictly speaking, the contingency of T’s existence doesn’t stand in
need of a truthmaker, since it is not a proposition. What Armstrong needs
here is that T makes that it is contingent that T exists true. One should note
that this claim needs to be a de dicto, not de re modal truth. If it were a de re
modal claim, it would not have the right form. Armstrong needs T to make
true }that T exists & }*that T exists, not that T exists contingently.10 The
former truth is a modal truth of the right form with obvious relevance to the
Possibility principle. The latter is not a truth of actual or mere possibility, as
deﬁned above.
Javier Kalhat [2008: 172], who provides the only argument for the falsity
of the Possibility principle that I’ve found in print, follows Armstrong’s lead
here and uses de re modal propositions in his argument. His example of an
instance of the Possibility principle is that the truthmaker for that Armstrong
exists is also the truthmaker for the proposition Armstrong is possibly non-
existent.11 Strictly speaking, this proposition is of the wrong form to be
relevant to the Possibility principle. In my discussion of the argument, I will
assume that when Armstrong says that T is a truthmaker for the
contingency of its existence, he means that T makes } that T exists &
}*that T exists true. Now for the two objections to this argument.
4. Two Problems with the New Argument
There are two serious problems with the argument: it makes an unwarranted
generalization, and it belies Armstrong’s desire for relevant truthmakers.
To see the ﬁrst problem, that the argument requires an unwarranted
generalization, consider the last two sentences of the above quotation. By
the penultimate sentence, Armstrong takes himself to have shown that the
truthmaker for the contingency of T’s existence is T itself. That is, he takes
himself to have shown that T makes it true that it is contingent that T exists.
Grant him that particular example. From here he concludes to the ultimate
sentence: ‘if T is a truthmaker for some contingent truth p, then it will also
be a truthmaker for that p is contingent’. That does not follow. The
penultimate sentence, provided the argument up to it is sound, secures
10Here and elsewhere in this article I aﬃx the box (¤) and diamond (}) to propositions to represent modal
propositions. Since I represent propositions by italicizing that-clauses, I’ve aﬃxed the modal operators to the
that-clauses, rather than removing the that from the that-clause (e.g., }T exists rather than }that T exists),
as is sometimes done.
11See also Kalhat [2008: 174]: ‘I argued that the Possibility Principle is false, since the truthmaker for, say, the
proposition5Armstrong exists4 cannot plausibly be taken to be also a truthmaker for the possibility of his
non-existence’. Kalhat goes on to provide an additional argument for the falsity of the Possibility principle
which I will not discuss here: the Possibility principle requires an application of the Entailment principle, and
the Entailment principle is false, so the Possibility principle must be false as well.
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truthmakers for modal truths about the existence of contingent beings. It
does not, however, provide truthmakers for all modal truths, as Armstrong
needs it to. Just because T is a truthmaker for that it is contingent that T
exists (again, granting that it is), it does not follow that if T is a truthmaker
for any contingent truth, p, then T is also a truthmaker for that p is
contingent. This is an illicit generalization. We need an argument that shows
that we can generalize from the smaller set of truths to the larger set.
It may be that truths about the contingency of an object’s existence are
made true by the object itself. For instance, Armstrong himself (or perhaps
his nature) may be a truthmaker for the truth that it is contingent that
Armstrong exists, though I have my doubts.12 There are, however, other
modal truths that don’t fare well on this argument. What of truths that
aren’t about the contingency of an object’s existence? The state of aﬀairs of
Armstrong’s being composed of N atoms, where N is greater than ﬁfty,
makes it true that something is composed of more than ﬁfty atoms. Does such
a state of aﬀairs thus make it true that it is contingent that something is
composed of more than ﬁfty atoms? It doesn’t seem to. Saying ‘It is
contingent that p’ is shorthand for ‘It is possible that p and it is possible that
it not be the case that p’. Does that particular state of aﬀairs really make it
true that it is possible that something is composed of more than ﬁfty atoms and
it is possible that it is not the case that something is composed of more than
ﬁfty atoms? Suppose N is ten billion. Then the state of aﬀairs, Armstrong’s
being composed of ten billion atoms, is a truthmaker for the truth that it is
possible that it is not the case that something is composed of more than ﬁfty
atoms. But this is false! Armstrong’s being composed of ten billion atoms
has nothing to do with whether or not it could be the case that nothing is
composed of more than ﬁfty atoms. At the very least, it is not clear that
Armstrong’s being composed of ten billion atoms is a truthmaker for that
claim; we need an argument for this. So the generalization is hasty:
Armstrong generalizes from a claim that might appear plausible to some—
that if T contingently exists, then T is a truthmaker for that it is contingent
that T exist—to a claim that allows for counterexamples—that if T is a
truthmaker for p and p is contingent, then T is a truthmaker for that p is
contingent.
Now consider a second problem for Armstrong’s new argument—the
problem of relevance. Armstrong desires relevant truthmakers for all truths.
He writes [2004: 85; his emphasis]:
We may also notice how attractive it is to hold that every contingent truth, not
merely every positive contingent truth, has a truthmaker. Given this, the
Entailment principle can then give the attractive result, attractive for those
looking for system and coherence, that these simple but relevant truthmakers
exist for every ‘mere possibility’.
12What about him does the work of making it true that it is contingent that Armstrong exists? And couldn’t it
be the case that it only does the work because of something that is true of all beings of his type? Couldn’t it be
that he is contingent only because he is a human (which he makes true) and that all humans are contingent
(which something besides Armstrong alone makes true, or nothing at all makes true)? This suggestion seems
plausible as well.
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Armstrong’s aim is to provide relevant truthmakers for modal truths.
Providing relevant truthmakers for truths should be the aim of any
truthmaker theorist, but especially one attempting to ﬁnd truthmakers for
modal truths. If relevance weren’t a necessary condition for a viable
truthmaker theory, any thing would be a truthmaker for every modal truth,
as I pointed out in the discussion of the Entailment principle. Armstrong’s
new argument for the Possibility principle belies this desire for relevant
truthmakers.13
Consider these lines from Armstrong’s new argument:
[I]t might have been there, but unaccompanied. And if so, must not the
truthmaker for the contingency of its existence be itself, T?
Why the ‘must’? It looks to me that the truthmaker must be T itself because
(a) it is true that T exists contingently, and (b) there must be some existing
thing to make it true. In that world, the world where T exists but is
unaccompanied, T is the only object around to do the work of truthmaking,
so it must be what makes it true that T exists contingently.
This leads to diﬃculties for Armstrong because he thinks (as most
philosophers writing on modality do) that truths of possibility are
themselves necessary.14 He writes, for instance, ‘[I]f p is contingent, it is a
necessary truth that it is contingent’ [2004: 85]. And again, ‘Most
philosophers, including myself, would take it is possible that not-p to be a
necessary truth’ [2004: 84]. So every modal truth—being necessary—is true
in the world where T exists unaccompanied—the world Armstrong posits
for his argument—but T is the only thing that exists in that world. Since
Armstrong aﬃrms truthmaker Maximalism—that all truths have truth-
makers—and aﬃrms that it is possible that T exist unaccompanied, T then
must be the truthmaker for all modal truths!
Surely this is a sin against the relevance requirement for truthmakers.
Whatever contingent being of nature T is, it can’t be a relevant truthmaker
for all modal truths. It can’t be a relevant truthmaker for that, necessarily,
2þ 2¼ 4 and that it is possible that there be three more men with brown hair in
Dyer, Indiana and that it is possible that everyone have one more friend and
that it is possible that David Armstrong is an astronaut and that it is possible
that Neil Armstrong is a philosopher. So Armstrong’s argument undercuts a
desideratum of his truthmaking theory: that truthmakers be relevant to the
truths they make true.
Either these modal truths have truthmakers or they don’t. If they don’t
have truthmakers, then Armstrong’s truthmaker Maximalism, a central
pillar of his work, is false. If these truths do have truthmakers, then T is
their truthmaker, since, as Armstrong assumes for argument, T alone exists
in this world. But then these truths do not have relevant truthmakers.
Armstrong’s aim with the Possibility principle is to provide relevant
truthmakers. So either Armstrong’s Maximalism is false or his desire for
13Another way of stating the same desideratum is that truthbearers must be about the truthmakers that make
them true. See, for instance, Merricks [2007: 28–34] and Lewis [2005: 25].
14That modal truths are themselves necessarily true follows from the S5 system.
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relevant truthmakers is unfulﬁlled. Either way, Armstrong’s new argument
for the Possibility principle goes contrary to his truthmaker theory.
5. Counterexamples to the Possibility Principle
Finally, even if my arguments against the Possibility principle fail, we
should still reject it since it is subject to counterexamples. Recall the earlier
example concerning the number of atoms that compose Armstrong. Or,
again, Armstrong’s being legged makes the contingent truth that something
has legs true. But his being legged doesn’t make it true that it is possible that
nothing has legs. Hilary Clinton’s making a bid for the presidency of the
United States of America makes the contingent truth that a woman has made
a bid for the presidency of the United States true. It doesn’t, though, make it
true that it is possible that no woman has made a bid for the presidency of the
United States. I take these and many other counterexamples to show that
the Possibility principle is false.
Strictly speaking, these are counterexamples to the conjunction of the
Possibility principle with the relevance (or aboutness) desideratum, not
counterexamples to the Possibility principle alone. One could drop the
relevance requirement rather than the Possibility principle if one so desired.
Armstrong does not so desire, though. He writes, ‘I do not want to retreat to
the view that these necessary truths, unlike contingent truths, lack
truthmakers or, what is practically equivalent, that all have the very same
truthmakers’ [2004: 98]. And even if one were to part ways with Armstrong
here and abandon the relevance requirement, doing so would make the
Possibility principle unnecessary. To see why, consider the following.
The Possibility principle is intended to provide relevant truthmakers. If
relevance didn’t matter, any existing thing would be a truthmaker for truths
of mere possibility. If one does not rein in a truthmaker principle with a
relevance condition, all modal truths would have trivial truthmakers. We
wouldn’t need the Possibility principle—the Entailment principle would
suﬃce. Dropping the relevance requirement makes the Possibility principle
irrelevant.
An objector may note that each of my examples requires use of the
Entailment principle.15 For instance, the atom example requires that that
Armstrong is composed of N atoms (where N is greater than ﬁfty) entails*
that something is composed of more than ﬁfty atoms. Why can’t Armstrong
deny this particular use of the Entailment principle, claiming that that
Armstrong is composed of N atoms is not relevant to the truth that something
is composed of more than ﬁfty atoms? Such a denial would save the
Possibility principle from this particular counterexample.
I think that this is a good suggestion for Armstrong, but I don’t think it
will save the Possibility principle. For, even if there might be reason to think
that this response works well for the number of atoms counterexample, it
doesn’t work nearly as well for the other counterexamples. Consider: is it
15I owe this objection to Joe Salerno.
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really true that the truth that Armstrong has legs is irrelevant to the truth
that something has legs? This is just an existential generalization. Likewise,
doesn’t that Hilary Clinton has made a bid for the presidency of the United
States relevantly entail that a woman has made a bid for the presidency of the
United States?
Elsewhere Armstrong himself uses similar existential generalizations to
provide truthmakers for truths. We don’t, for instance, need a general
state of aﬀairs of something existing for it to be true that something exists.
Rather, each individual thing makes it true that something exists [2004: 89–
91]. But this is just an application of the Entailment principle, and, in fact,
it is wholly similar to my use of the Entailment principle concerning
Armstrong’s having legs. Also see Armstrong’s discussion of the truth-
makers for the truth that at least one contingent being exists. The truthmaker
for such a claim isn’t the general state of aﬀairs of at least one contingent
thing’s existing; rather, each contingent thing is a minimal truthmaker for
this truth. Again, we see Armstrong using the Entailment principle to
provide truthmakers for existential generalizations in the same way I use the
Entailment principle in my counterexamples.
Without delving into Armstrong’s account of truthmakers for necessary
truths, we can see that it, too, relies on the Possibility principle, and hence it
is subject to the same diﬃculties as his account of truthmakers for truths of
mere possibility. Armstrong writes of a beneﬁt of his theory of truthmakers
for necessary truths [2000: 158]:
[T]he real pay-oﬀ of the point that necessary truths require no more than
truthmakers for the possibility of the existence of their terms lies in the result,
if it is a result, that I reached earlier in this paper. Provided that the terms are
always contingent beings, provided that there are no necessary beings, then we
can appeal to the truthmakers already proposed for truths that assert the
possibility of some contingency.
The result that Armstrong refers to here is the Possibility principle.
Since Armstrong’s account of truthmakers for both truths of possibility
and truths of necessity requires the Possibility principle, and the Possibility
principle should be rejected, Armstrong’s account of truthmakers for modal
truths ought to be rejected as well. It may be that giants aren’t required for
modal metaphysics, but Armstrong’s Possibility principle is not the giant
slayer he intends it to be; it is no David.16
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